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 
Abstract—This paper proposes a fully homomorphic 
encryption encapsulated difference expansion (FHEE-DE) 
scheme for reversible data hiding in encrypted domain (RDH-ED). 
In the proposed scheme, we use key-switching and bootstrapping 
techniques to control the ciphertext extension and decryption 
failure. To realize the data extraction directly from the encrypted 
domain without the private key, a key-switching based 
least-significant-bit (KS-LSB) data hiding method has been 
designed. In application, the user first encrypts the plaintext and 
uploads ciphertext to the server. Then the server performs data 
hiding by FHEE-DE and KS-LSB to obtain the marked ciphertext. 
Additional data can be extracted directly from the marked 
ciphertext by the server without the private key. The user can 
decrypt the marked ciphertext to obtain the marked plaintext. 
Then additional data or plaintext can be obtained from the 
marked plaintext by using the standard DE extraction or recovery. 
A fidelity constraint of DE is introduced to reduce the distortion 
of the marked plaintext. FHEE-DE enables the server to 
implement FHEE-DE recovery or extraction on the marked 
ciphertext, which returns the ciphertext of original plaintext or 
additional data to the user. In addition, we simplified the 
homomorphic operations of the proposed universal FHEE-DE to 
obtain an efficient version. The Experimental results demonstrate 
that the embedding capacity, fidelity, and reversibility of the 
proposed scheme are superior to existing RDH-ED methods, and 
fully separability is achieved without reducing the security of 
encryption. 
Index Terms—Information security, reversible data hiding in 
encrypted domain, difference expansion, public key cryptography, 
and fully homomorphic encryption. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EVERSIBLE data hiding in encrypted domain (RDH-ED) is 
an information hiding technique that aims to not only 
accurately embed and extract the additional messages in the 
ciphertext, but also restore the original plaintext losslessly 
[1][2]. RDH-ED is useful in some distortion intolerable 
applications, such as ciphertext management or retrieval in the 
cloud, ciphertext annotation for medical or military use. With 
the increasing demand for information security and the 
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development of the encrypted signal processing techniques, 
RDH-ED has been an issue of great attention in the field of 
privacy protection and ciphertext processing. 
From the viewpoint of the cryptosystem that RDH-ED 
methods are based on, existing RDH-ED methods could be 
classified into two categories: Symmetric encryption based 
RDH-ED [1], [3]- [14], and public key encryption based 
RDH-ED [20]-[29]. Symmetric cryptography that has been 
introduced into RDH-ED includes stream encryption [1], 
[3]-[6], [13]- [13], advanced encryption standard (AES) [7], [8], 
and RC4 encryption [9].  
According to the methods of utilizing the redundancy in the 
cover for data hiding, symmetric encryption based RDH-ED 
methods were classified into two categories [1][2]: “vacating 
room before encryption (VRBE)” [1][7][8][10][13] and 
“vacating room after encryption (VRAE)”[3]-[6]. The room, 
namely the redundancy in the cover, is vacated for reversible 
data hiding. The first RDH-ED method was proposed by Zhang 
for encrypted images [3], and then [4]-[5] enhanced its capacity. 
Qian et al. proposed a similar method to embed data in an 
encrypted JPEG bit stream [6]. AES was introduced in [7] to 
encrypt the cover image. Each block containing n pixels could 
carry one bit data. The embedding rate (ER) is 1/n bits per pixel 
(bpp). Then difference prediction was introduced before 
encryption in [8], and AES was used to encrypt pixels except 
the embedding ones, thus resulting in a better embedding 
capacity (EC) and reversibility. However, it needed decryption 
first before data extraction in the above RDH-ED methods, 
which restricted the practicability in practical applications. The 
separable RDH-ED was proposed in [11][12]. Separability has 
been so far an important attribute of practicality for current 
RDH-ED.  
The redundancy introduced by VABE or VARE is 
independent from the encryption, resulting in the mutual 
restriction between decryption distortion and the embedding 
capacity, which is a major obstacle to the realization of 
separability and a high EC. There existed two main solutions 
proposed: one is to improve the quality of redundancy 
introduced before encryption. For example in [13], a separable 
high embedding algorithm was proposed by making full use of 
prediction error introduced before encryption. Second, the 
correlation of the plaintext is preserved in the ciphertext, so that 
RDH in spatial domain, such as difference expansion technique 
(DE) [15], histogram shifting technique (HS) [16]-[18], could 
be implemented in the encrypted domain. For example in [14], 
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a new framework of RDH-ED was proposed, in which a 
specific stream cipher was used to preserve the correlation 
between the neighboring pixels. The above mentioned 
symmetric encryption based algorithms are fast and efficient in 
practice, which has significant research value and technological 
potential in the future.  
However, there are also technical defects in symmetric 
encryption based RDH-ED. The correlation of plaintext would 
be destroyed because of the confusion and diffusion principles 
of symmetric encryption. To achieve reversible data hiding, it 
usually needs to introduce embedding redundancy. While it is 
difficult to vacate room after encryption, the current attention 
focuses more on the VEBE methods [13], by which more 
computational expense is introduced into the client end for data 
hiding. The preprocessing in the plaintext is similar to data 
compression, and the compression capability determines the 
performance of RDH-ED. As for the methods of preserving 
plaintext correlation by a specific encryption [14], it currently 
mainly relies on reusing the same random sequence to encrypt a 
specific pixel block. It could provide certain security 
guarantees, but key reusing would weaken the encryption 
intensity of the symmetric encryption in theory. The more 
correlation among ciphertext is remained, the more the 
encryption intensity is reduced. The RC4 encryption was 
declared breached in 2013 [19], RDH-ED based on early RC4 
has certain limitations in future security applications. In 
addition, symmetric encryption requires a geometrically 
increasing amount of encryption keys with the number of 
communication participants. The local key storage cost is high 
for each user.  
Compared with symmetric encryption, public key encryption 
has some advantages for RDH-ED, which is worthy of our 
attention: first, public key encryption requires a linear 
increasing amount of key usage in the communication network. 
The local key storage cost is only the private key of the user’s 
own, while all the public keys are publicly released. It has been 
widely used in electronic finance and network communication 
protocols, which provides application prospects for RDH-ED. 
Second, public key encryption introduces ciphertext extension, 
namely, the redundancy from the ciphertext itself. Through a 
certain embedding strategy [28], we could select embedding 
positions and improve EC effectively. Third, flexible 
cryptosystems of the public key encryption, especially the 
homomorphic encryption, provide reliable technical supports 
for RDH-ED. However, there are still technical limitations and 
application dilemmas in public key based RDH-ED. We shall 
discuss those in Section II.  This paper focuses on the current 
state of public key based RDH-ED, aiming at making full use of 
LWE-based fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) technique to 
implement DE encapsulation. A novel RDH-ED method is 
proposed, which is superior to the current public key based 
RDH-ED in practicality, security and reversibility.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The following 
section introduces the art of state about public encryption based 
RDH-ED and analyzes the potential of DE for RDH-ED. 
Section III introduces the techniques of FHE, key-switching, 
and bootstrapping. Section IV describes the detailed processes 
of the proposed full homomorphic encryption encapsulated 
difference expansion. In Section V, the three judging standards 
of RDH-ED, including correctness, security and efficiency, are 
discussed theoretically and verified with experimental results. 
Finally, Section VI summarizes the paper and discusses future 
investigations. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Public Encryption Based RDH-ED 
Currently, researches of public key encryption based RDH-ED 
are mainly based on Paillier encryption [20]-[26] and learning 
with Error (LWE) encryption [27]-[29]. Probabilistic and 
homomorphic properties of the above cryptography allow the 
third party, i.e., the cloud servers, to conduct operations directly 
on ciphertext without knowing the private key, which shows 
potential for more flexible realizations of RDH-ED.  
The first Paillier encryption based RDH-ED was proposed 
by Chen et al. [20]. Shiu et al. [21] and Wu et al.
 
[22] improved 
the EC of [20] by solving the pixel overflow problem. Those 
algorithms were VRBE methods. Li et al. in [25]
 
proposed a 
VRAE method with a considerable EC by utilizing the 
homomorphic addition property of Paillier encryption and HS 
technique. The above algorithms were all inseparable. Data 
extraction was implemented only in the plaintext domain. It 
was a crucial bottleneck of public key encryption based 
RDH-ED to realize data extraction directly from the encrypted 
domain. Wu et al. proposed two RDH-ED algorithms for the 
encrypted images in [24]: a high-capacity algorithm based on 
Paillier cryptosystem was presented for data extraction after 
image decryption. The other one could operate data extraction 
in the encryption domain. Zhang et al. [23] proposed a 
combined scheme consisting of a lossless scheme and a 
reversible scheme to realize separability. Data was extracted 
from the encrypted domain in the lossless scheme and from the 
plaintext domain in the reversible scheme. In [26], Xiang 
embedded the ciphertext of additional data into the LSBs of the 
encrypted pixels by employing homomorphic multiplication. 
Only the ciphertext of additional data could be obtained during 
extraction directly from ciphertext. To distinguish the 
corresponding plaintext of the ciphertext of additional data 
without the private key, a one-to-one mapping table from 
ciphertext to plaintext was introduced while the ciphertext of 
additional data for embedding was not from encryption but 
from the mapping table. However, the exposure and 
accumulation of a large number of the mapping tables to an 
untrusted third party might increase the risk of cryptanalysis in 
theory, while the Paillier algorithms cannot resist adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attack (ACCA or CCA2) [30]. 
LWE based RDH-ED was first proposed in [26] by 
quantifying the LWE encrypted domain and recoding the 
redundancy from ciphertext. Ke et al. fixed the parameters for 
LWE encryption and proposed a multilevel RDH-ED with a 
flexible applicability and high EC in [27]. However, the 
data-hiding key used for extraction overlapped partly with the 
private key for decryption, thus resulting in limitation for 
embedding by a third party. In [29], separability could be 
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achieved by preserving correlation from the plaintext in the 
ciphertext through a modified somewhat LWE encryption. 
However, the correlation among ciphertext was strong, and it 
was theoretically vulnerable to cryptanalysis attacks.  
In summary, the public key based RDH-ED has difficulties 
in the implementation of separability. Usually, EC and the 
fidelity are inferior to existing RDH in spatial domain. 
Therefore, this paper proposes a novel scheme of FHE 
encapsulated DE (FHEE-DE) to realize data hiding in 
encrypted domain based on LWE. A fidelity constraint is 
proposed for FHEE-DE, which has distinctly enhanced the 
Peak Signal-Noise Ratio (PSNR) of the directly decrypted 
images. Modified bit-addition and bit-subtraction circuits for 
FHEE-DE are designed. Key-switching and bootstrapping are 
introduced to control the ciphertext extension and decryption 
failure, which provides the feasibility of introducing other 
existing RDH methods. To realize separability, a key-switching 
based least significant bit data hiding (KS-LSB) method is 
proposed to ensure the extraction directly from the encrypted 
domain without the private key. Finally, to improve the 
efficiency, we propose an efficient FHEE-DE besides the 
universal one. Experimental results demonstrated that the 
performances of the proposed scheme in EC, fidelity, and 
reversibility are superior to DE in [15] and existing public key 
based RDH-ED methods, and fully separability is achieved 
without reducing the security of LWE encryption.  
B. Difference Expansion 
The difference expansion technique is an important part of 
the early RDH algorithms, appearing together with the 
histogram shifting technique. It is characterized by specific 
numerical modification of specific pixels, making it reversible 
under the premise of fault tolerance. However, due to the image 
distortion, the degree of modification on pixels is limited. The 
constraints of selecting available pixel pairs increase with the 
requirements of reversibility and EC of RDH technology, 
which currently has restricted the development of DE 
algorithms. The HS based RDH and its variant algorithms have 
become the focus in image spatial domain. However, 
considering the potential of being encapsulated by FHE, DE 
has more advantages than HS: 
1. The less computational and memory consumption. The 
object of DE is one specific pair of pixels while that of HS 
relies on the statistical characteristics of the image pixels as a 
whole. Therefore, the object of FHEE-DE is specific pairs of 
encrypted pixels while that of FHE encapsulated HS might be 
the plaintext statistical characteristics obtained by processing in 
the encrypted domain. The computational and memory 
consumption of calculating statistical characteristics from the 
ciphertext might be much larger, because the number of pixels 
involved in the calculation is large, and it has to store a large 
number of logical decisions (the results cannot be logically 
compared directly in the encrypted domain, and multiple 
possible states need to be saved at the same time). 
2. The higher accuracy of cover recovery. The reversibility 
of DE is the deterministic reversibility of maintaining the 
correctness of arithmetic operations, while the reversibility of 
HS is the probabilistic reversibility of maintaining histogram 
statistical features. Therefore, DE has advantages in 
maintaining the accuracy of cipher recovery after 
homomorphic operations.  
In addition, there are many interesting implementations 
[31][32] of DE algorithms. DE algorithms and their variants 
should be suitable for being introduced into RDH-ED through 
FHE technology.  
This paper started with the earliest DE algorithm [15] and 
proposed a scheme of FHE encapsulated DE, aiming to provide 
a technical foundation for the introduction of more DE based 
algorithms in the later stage.  
In Tian’s algorithm [15], two adjacent pixels X and Y from an 
image I can be used to hide one additional bit bs, where 0≤ X, Y 
≤ 255 and bs {0, 1}. First, the difference h and average value l 
(integer) of X and Y are computed as following:  
h = X - Y                               (1) 
l = 
2
X Y 
 
 
                         (2) 
X = l + 
1
2
h  
 
 
                      (3) 
Y = l - 
2
h 
 
 
                            (4) 
Assuming X > Y, and .    is the floor function meaning “the 
biggest integer less than or equal to” while .    is the ceiling 
function. 
Data hiding: 
h' = 2×h+bs                              (5) 
The embedded pixels X' and Y' can be obtained by 
substituting h' into Eqs. (3), (4). 
Extration: 
bs = LSB(h')                              (6) 
LSB(.) is to obtain the least significant bit of the input integer. 
Recovery: 
h=
'
2
h 
 
 
                                   (7) 
Then, the original pixels X and Y can be recovered by using 
Eqs. (3), (4).  
III. PRELIMINARIES 
1) Full homomorphic encryption 
A cryptosystem that supports arbitrary computation on 
ciphertext is known as fully homomorphic encryption. Such a 
scheme enables the construction of programs for any desirable 
functionality, which can be run on encrypted inputs to produce 
an encryption of the result. Since such a program never needs to 
decrypt its inputs, it can be run by an untrusted party without 
revealing its inputs and internal state. Therefore, FHE has great 
practical advantages on outsourcing the private computations 
for reversible data hiding. 
Craig Gentry, [33] using LWE in lattice based cryptography, 
described the first construction for a FHE scheme. Gentry's 
scheme supports both addition and multiplication operations on 
ciphertext, from which it is possible to construct circuits for 
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performing arbitrary complex computation. A brief review of 
FHE [33] is as following: 
The private key is denoted as s, and the public key A is 
generated by s and e satisfying Eq. (8), where e is sampled 
randomly: 
A · s = 2e                                  (8) 
Encryption: 
The plaintext is m{0, 1}. Set m =(m, 0, 0,…,0). Generate a 
0-1 sequence
ra  uniformly and output the ciphertext: 
c = m + A
T
ar                                          (9) 
Decryption: 
 
T
T T T
2 2 2
, ,r rq q q
                       
c s m + A a s m s + A a s  
T T
2 2
2r rq q
m m                
+ a As + a e =m                      (10) 
where [.]q means to perform modulo q. The correctness lies in 
that the total introduced noise could be restrained to meet:  
T
ra e  
< q/4                                            (11)  
To demonstrate the FHE ability, we assume the LWE 
ciphertext c1, c2 are: 1 1 1 12m q  c r p , 2 2 2 22m q  c r p . 
FHE. Add: 
      1 2 1 2 1 2 1 22m m q  c + c + p + p r + r                     (12) 
where the correctness lies in that the total introduced noise 
could be restrained to meet: 
 1 2r r < q/4                                   (13) 
FHE. Multiply:  
 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 22 2m m m m    c c r + r r r    
 2 1 1 2 1 2q qc p + c p p p           (14) 
where the correctness lies in that the total introduced noise 
could be restrained to meet: 
1 2 2 1 1 22m m r + r r r < q/4                   (15) 
2) Key –switching [34] 
There is data expansion in LWE encrypted ciphertext [28], but 
in FHE, a secondary expansion would occur when ciphertext 
got multiplied. The homomorphic multiplication between the 
ciphertext matrices returns the ciphertext tensor product, and 
the private key is also subjected to the tensor product operation 
before being used to decrypt the new ciphertext. Therefore, the 
amount of data will again expand geometrically. 
In our scheme, the ciphertext of the pixel bits will get 
expanded after each multiplication. It also occurs after addition 
or subtraction between encrypted pixels due to the cases of bit 
carry or bit borrow, resulting in a large number of 
multiplication and exclusive or operations among ciphertext of 
pixel bit. If the secondary expansion cannot be eliminated or 
controlled, the amount of ciphertext data can produce an 
excessively extension that is unacceptable in practice. 
Key-switching can effectively eliminate the extension by 
replacing the extended ciphertext with new ciphertext of any 
shorter length without decrypting it, and ensure the new 
ciphertext corresponds to the same decryption as the extended 
ciphertext.  
We use the key-switching technique to eliminate the 
ciphertext secondary expansion in FHEE-DE, that is, 
key-switching is implemented following each homomorphic 
operation. What is more, a key-switching based LSB data 
hiding method is proposed in this paper. 
3) Bootstrapping Encryption [35] 
The introduced noise, on the one hand, provides the security 
guarantee of the LWE algorithm. On the other hand, noise 
superposition will also affect the correctness of decryption. 
Usually, the one-way fluctuation interval of required noise 
cannot exceed a quarter of the encrypted domain. 
Homomorphic operations result in the superposition of noise as 
shown in Eqs. (11)(13)(15), which makes the correctness of 
decryption unstable. Key-switching cannot eliminate noise 
superposition. Therefore, the decryption overflow problem is 
an important issue to be considered in FHEE-DE. Usually, the 
simplest method is to limit the standard deviation of the 
sampling noise distribution, so that the noise fluctuation range 
is very small and the overflow will not occur after several times 
of superposition. Although efficient, it is not enough to support 
many or even theoretically infinite holomorphic operations. If 
the number of homomorphic operations is limited, it limits the 
realization of homomorphic encapsulation of DE, and it is not 
conducive to further extending to other variants of DE.  
Public key
Ciphertext1
Encryption
Ciphertext2
Encryption
Private key
Encrypted secret key
Decryption
Ciphertext3
…………
………………………………
…………………………
………………………………………………………………
…………
………………………………
…………………………
………………
…
…………
…………………
…
Fig. 1. The sketch of the bootstrapping process. 
In this paper, we use bootstrapping to reduce the superposed 
noise. The sketch of bootstrapping is as shown in Fig. 1: 
ciphertext1 carries superposed noise. A public key is used to 
encrypt ciphertext1 and the private key simultaneously. The 
encrypted private key is then used to decrypt the ciphertext2 
(the encrypted ciphertext1) to obtain ciphertext3. The 
decryption process eliminates the noise in ciphertext1, but 
retains the noise from the bootstrapping encryption in 
ciphertext 3. Therefore, bootstrapping does not change the data 
length of ciphertext or the key, but it can restore the total noise 
amount after several times of superposition into the noise 
amount introduced by only once bootstrapping encryption (for 
more details in [35]). 
Key-switching and bootstrapping are used to ensure 
FHEE-DE based RDH-ED has good practicability and 
scalability. The use and parameter requirements of the 
algorithm will be introduced in detail in the following sections, 
and some adaptive modifications will also be made to meet the 
specific requirements of reversibility. The main drawback of 
the two techniques is the large number of public keys required. 
Fortunately, users only need to store the private key for 
decryption. The public keys are all released publicly on the 
internet or the cloud instead of stored locally after their 
generation. The storage problem caused by the large amount of 
public keys can be ignored in practice, which is also the 
advantage of public key cryptosystem in application. Besides, 
the operation of generating public keys is not strictly in series 
with other processes, so parallel optimization techniques can be 
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used to improve the efficiency. The parallel optimization is not 
the consideration of this paper.  
IV. FULL HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION ENCAPSULATED 
DIFFERENCE EXPANSION 
A. Framework of FHEE-DE 
Marked 
ciphertext
Plaintext Encryption
Public key 
Ciphertext
FHE encapsulated 
DE data hiding
Client users The third servers
Ciphertext
Encrypted 
additional 
data
 LSB extration Decryption
Marked 
ciphertext
Marked
plaintext
Private key
DE extration 
Additional 
data
FHE 
encapsulated 
DE extration
Encrypted 
additional 
data
DE recovery 
Encrypted 
additional 
message
Decryption
Private key
FHE 
encapsulated 
DE recovery
Ciphertext'Ciphertext'Plaintext Decryption
Additional 
data
Key-switching 
based LSB 
data hiding
Additional 
dataClient users
 
(a) 
Marked 
ciphertext
Plaintext Encryption
Public key 
Client users The third servers 
Private key
Additional 
data
FHE 
encapsulated 
DE extration
Encrypted 
additional 
data
Encrypted 
additional 
message
Decryption
FHE 
encapsulated 
DE recovery
Ciphertext'Ciphertext'Plaintext Decryption
DE data 
hiding
Marked
plaintext
Marked 
ciphertext
Additional data
Client users
 LSB 
extration
Additional 
data'
Key-switching based 
LSB data hiding
Marked 
ciphertext'
 
(b) 
Fig. 2. The two schematic flows of the applications of FHEE-DE: (a) Data hiding in the third server side; (b) Data hiding in both the client and server side. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the application framework of FHEE-DE 
consists of two types: (a) Data hiding in the third server side. (b) 
Data hiding in both the client and server side. We take type a as 
an example to explain the application: the user encrypts the 
plaintext and uploads its ciphertext to the server. The server 
performs FHEE-DE data hiding and KS-LSB data hiding to 
obtain the marked ciphertext. FHEE-DE data hiding ensures 
that the decryption would contain additional data. KS-LSB data 
hiding enables the server to extract additional data directly from 
the marked ciphertext. For the marked ciphertext, there are four 
cases: a) the client obtains and decrypts it directly to obtain the 
marked plaintext. DE extraction or recovery can be 
implemented to obtain additional data or the plaintext losslessly. 
b) Additional data can be extracted directly by the server 
without using the private key, which enables the (trusted or 
untrusted) third party to manage ciphertext flexibly under the 
premise of keeping the plaintext secret. c) The third server 
returns new ciphertext through FHEE-DE recovery. The client 
user can obtain the plaintext by decrypting the new ciphertext. d) 
FHEE-DE extraction returns the encrypted additional data. The 
client user can obtain the additional data by decrypting the 
encrypted additional data. 
B. Universal FHEE-DE 
1) Preprocessing of DE    
a) Overflow/Underflow and Fidelity Constraints 
The plaintext is a 512×512 image I. I is divided into 
non-overlapping pixel pairs. Each pair consists of two adjacent 
pixels. Next, we take one pair of pixels, denoted as (X, Y), as an 
example to introduce our scheme, where 0≤ X, Y ≤ 255. The 
additional bit is bs {0, 1}.As grayscale values are bounded in 
[0, 255], we have h and l according to Eqs. (1), (2) and then: 
0≤ l + 
1
2
h  
 
 
≤ 255                               (16) 
0≤ l - 
2
h 
 
 
≤ 255                                    (17) 
To avoid overflow or underflow problems after data hiding, 
we use a map matrix Mava 
 
256 256
0,1

 to indicate available 
pixel pairs. Value “1” indicates the bigger pixel within an 
available adjacent pixel pair for DE data hiding. The difference 
h of an available pair should satisfy the following constraints 
[15]: 
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|h|    ≤ min (2(255-l), 2l+1)                       (18) 
|2·h+bs | ≤ min (2(255-l), 2l+1)                       (19) 
for b= 0 or 1.  
  When performing FHEE-DE, we add an extra fidelity 
constraint: the available pixel pairs are preferentially selected 
with a smaller pixel difference. The fidelity parameter hfid is 
introduced here as another constraint:  
h ≤ hfid                                   (20) 
Mava would be lossless compressed as side information of the 
ciphertext to superimpose on the host signal.  
b) Parameters Setting and Function Definition 
The cryptosystem is parameterized by the integers: n (the 
length of the private key), q (n2, 2n2) (the modulus), d≥
(1+ε)(1+n)log2q (the dimension of the public key space) , ε>0. 
If q is a prime, all the operations in the cryptosystem are 
performed modulo q in q , β= 2log q   . We denote the noise 
probability distribution on q as  , qΨ   , where the 
discrete Gaussian distribution {qΨ   「qx」mod q | x ~N (0, 
2 )}, and 「qx」 denotes rounding qx to the nearest integer [28].  
Definition 1: The private key generating function: 
s = SKGen n, q (.)                                          (21) 
which returns the private key s n
q : s = (1, t), where t 
1n
q
  
is sampled from the distribution  . 
Definition 2: The public key generating function: 
A = PKGen (d, n), q( s )                                     (22) 
in which a matrix W ( 1)d n
q
  is first generated uniformly and a 
vector e d
q is sampled from the distribution  , then the 
vector b d
q  is obtained:   
b = Wt + 2e                                          (23) 
the n-column matrix A d n  is consisting of b followed by 
-W,  , -A = b W . A is returned as the public key. 
Remark: Observe that A·s = 2e for Eq. (8). 
Definition 3: The encrypting function: 
c = EncA ( m )                                      (24) 
which returns a vector c as the ciphertext of one bit plaintext m
 0,1 with the public key A: Set m =(m, 0, 0,…,0)
 2
n . 
Generate a random vector ra 2
d  uniformly and output c: 
c = m + A
T
ar                                                           (25) 
Definition 4[34]: The function BitDe(x),
 
x n
q , decomposes 
x into its bit representation. Namely, it outputs (u1, u2, u3, … , 
uβ,) 
n
q
 , x=
1
0
2 j j
j
 

 u  , uj 2n . 
Definition 5: The decrypting function: 
m = Decs (c) =
2
,
q
    
c s                    (26) 
which returns the plaintext bit m  0,1 with the private key s. 
If the inputs of the decryption function are in binary form, we 
could regard such a function as a decryption circuit, denoted as 
Dec*S (C), C= BitDe(c), S= BitDe(s). 
Definition 6[34]: The function Powersof(x),
 
x n
q , outputs 
the vector (x, 2x, 22x, … , 2β-1x,)
 
n
q
 . 
Next, we will give the procedure of key-switching, which 
takes a ciphertext c1 under s1 and outputs new ciphertext c2 that 
encrypts the same plaintext under the private key s2. 
Definition 7[34]: The switching key generating function: 
B = SwitchKGen (s1, s2)                              (27) 
where s1
1n
q , s2
2n
q . Atemp= PKGen(n1•β, n2), q( s2 ). The 
matrix B
 1 2n n
q
 
 can be obtained by adding Powersof(s1) to 
Atemp’s first column. 
Ciphertext c2 can be obtained by using the switching key: 
c2  = BitDe (c1)
T 
· B                                  (28) 
The secondary data expansion of the ciphertext is resulted 
from the homomorphic multiplication. Namely, we need to 
operate key-switching after each tensor product of ciphertext. 
Specifically, we would transform c c under s s into c under 
s. Therefore, the switching keys for eliminating the secondary 
data expansion should be: 
B = SwitchKGen (s s, s)                         (29) 
where s s
 
n n
q
 , s nq . 
c) Key Distribution  
In our scheme, there is a key-switching based LSB data hiding 
method proposed to ensure that the servers could directly 
extract additional data from ciphertext without using the private 
key. We generate a pseudo-random binary sequence k for the 
servers to randomly scramble the additional data before 
KS-LSB data hiding. The switching key for KS-LSB data 
hiding is: 
BLSB = SwitchKGen (s, s)                         (30) 
where s n
q .All different keys are distributed as shown in 
Table I: 
TABLE I 
KEY DISTRIBUTION 
Classification Denotation Function Owner 
Private key s 
1. Public key and switching 
key generation. 
2. Plaintext and additional 
data decryption. 
Client user 
Public key A 
1. Data encryption. 
2. Bootstrapping. 
Servers with 
open access 
Switching 
key 
B , BLSB 
1. Key-switching. 
2. Data hiding by servers 
Servers with 
open access 
Data hiding 
key 
k 
Data hiding and extraction 
from ciphertext by servers 
Servers 
 
2) Encryption 
For the pixel pair (X, Y), whose iLSBs are denoted by i
Xb , 
i
Yb  
(i=1, 2, … , 8), each bit is encrypted by LWE encryption with a 
new public key. We omit the symbol “A” in Eq. (24) for short in 
this paper: i
Xc = Enc (
i
Xb  ), 
i
Yc = Enc (
i
Yb  ), i=1, 2,…, 8. 
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3) FHE encapsulated DE data hiding 
a) Calculation circuits design 
To realize FHE encapsulated DE, we designed the calculation 
circuits as Fig. 3 shows. Compared with traditional circuits, we 
made some simplification on the carry or borrow cases of the 
highest/lowest bit and the positive or negative sign judgment, 
which was mainly based on the bit length of pixels and the 
overflow/underflow constraints in preprocessing. It should be 
noted that homomorphic circuits share the same internal 
relationships and operation types as the above calculation 
circuits, except that it is arithmetic operations which are 
performed modulo 2 in calculation circuits (Fig. 3(a)) while 
those would be matrix operations and performed modulo q in 
homomorphic circuits (Fig. 3(b)). 
Pixel adding circuit Add* of (X+Y) in binary form is as 
following: 
( 8
sumb ,
7
sumb ,…, 
1
sumb )=Add*(
8
Xb ,
7
Xb ,…,
1
Xb ; 
8
Yb ,
7
Yb ,…,
1
Yb )       (31) 
In Add*, there are eight refreshing in order from 1 to 8 due to 
the bit carry case. After each refreshing, one more bit of the 
sum would be outputted and the inputs would be refreshed. In 
refreshing i (i=1 to 8):
sum
i i i
X Yb b b  , 
i j i j
X Xb b
    
 1 2...i i j i j iY X X Xb b b b    , i j i jY Yb b  , 1,2,...,8j i   .  
In this section, assuming X > Y, the subtracting circuit Sub* 
of (X-Y) is designed (we could confirm the bigger one between 
a pair (X, Y) according to the map Mava): 
( 8
difb ,
7
difb ,…, 
1
difb )=Sub*(
8
Xb ,
7
Xb ,…, 
1
Xb ;
8
Yb ,
7
Yb ,…,
1
Yb )   (32) 
In Sub*, there are eight refreshing in order from 1 to 8 due to 
the bit borrow case. The internal relationship between inputs 
and outputs is exhibited in Fig. 3(c). After each refreshing, one 
more bit of the difference would be outputted and the minuend 
would be refreshed. In refreshing i (i=1 to 8):
 
1 1 1
dif X Yb b b  ,
dif temp
i ib b 
i
Yb ,   1 2temp temp temp temp1 1 ...i j i j i i j i jYb b b b b         
 temp 1ib  , i j i jY Yb b  , 1,2,...,8j i   . 
 
Add*
(mod2)
...
 8Xb
7
Xb
1
Xb
...
...
8
Yb
7
Yb
1
Yb
...
...
8
sumb
7
sumb
1
sumb
...
Input
Input
(a) 
Sub*
...
 8Xb
7
Xb
1
Xb
...
...
...
8
difb
7
difb
1
difb
...
Minuend 
Subtrahend
8
Yb
7
Yb
1
Yb
...
The subtrahend by  bit
Sub*
(by bit)
...
 8Xb
7
Xb
1
Xb
...
...
...
8
tempb
...
1
Yb
...
0
0
7
tempb
2
tempb
0
Sub*
(by bit)
...
2
Yb
0
0
0
3
Yb
… ...
8
tempb
Sub*
(by bit)
8
difb
0
0
0
1
difb
...
8
tempb
...
7
tempb
3
tempb
Sub*
(by bit)
...
0
0
0
0
0
2
difb
...
8
tempb
...
7
tempb
4
tempb
3
difb
8
Yb  
(c) 
Add*
(mod q)
...
8
Xc
7
Xc
1
Xc
...
8
Yc
7
Yc
1
Yc
...
...
8
sumc
7
sumc
1
sumc
...
Input
Input...
 (b) 
Fig. 3. Circuit sketch: (a) The pixel adding circuit Add*; (b) The homomorphic adding circuit; (c) The pixel subtracting circuit Sub*. 
b) FHE encapsulated DE data hiding 
Denote the iLSB of h and l as i
hb and 
i
lb , and the additional bit is 
bs. 
i
hc =Enc(
i
hb  ), 
i
lc =Enc(
i
lb  ) (i=1, 2, … , 8). 
Step 1: Calculate i
hc (i=1, 2, … , 8) (
8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc ). 
According to Eq. (1), ( 8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc )= Sub*(
8
Xc ,
7
Xc ,…, 
1
Xc ;
8
Yc ,
7
Yc ,…, 
1
Yc ). 
Step 2: Calculate the encrypted (X+Y)  (
8
sumc ,
7
sumc ,…, 
1
sumc )= Add* (
8
Xc , 
7
Xc ,…, 
1
Xc ;
8
Yc ,
7
Yc ,…, 
1
Yc ). 
Step 3: Calculate ctemp0= Enc(0), and the encrypted l, (
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ), can be obtained according to Eq. (2): (
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ) =(ctemp0,
8
sumc ,
7
sumc ,…, 
2
sumc ). 
Step 4: Calculate cbs= Enc(bs) and refresh ctemp0= Enc(0). The 
encrypted h'  (
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc ) can be obtained according to 
Eq. (5): ( 8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc ) = Add*(
7
hc ,
6
hc ,…, 
1
hc , ctemp0; ctemp0, 
ctemp0,…, ctemp0, 
cbs). 
Step 5: Calculate ctemp1= Enc(1). And calculate the encrypted 
(h'+1)  (
8
sum'c ,
7
sum'c ,…, 
1
sum'c )= Add* (
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc ; 
ctemp0, ctemp0,…, ctemp0, 
ctemp1).  
Step 6: Refresh ctemp0= Enc(0). The encrypted X' and Y' after 
DE data hiding are restored according to Eqs. (3)-(4): 
 ( 8
'Xc ,
7
'Xc  ,…, 
1
'Xc )= Add*(
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ; 
 ctemp0,
8
sum'c ,
7
sum'c ,…, 
2
sum'c )        (33) 
( 8
'Yc ,
7
'Yc ,…, 
1
'Yc )= Sub*(
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ; 
 ctemp0, 
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
2
'hc )             (34) 
Following each homomorphic multiplication, key-switching 
is implemented to eliminate the secondary data expansion of 
ciphertext. The bootstrapping is implemented for every 10 
homomorphic multiplication or 100 homomorphic addition to 
control noise excessive stacking. 
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4) Key-switching based LSB data hiding 
Step 1: Randomly scramble the additional data sequence bs by 
using data hiding key k to obtain the to-be-embedded data br: 
br =k⊕bs                                       (35) 
where br   br. Denote the last element of 
1
'Xc as cLX1, whose 
LSB would be replaced by br (X is the “1” signed pixel by Mava). 
Step 2: If br = LSB(cLX1),
1
'Xc maintains the same, or if br ≠ 
LSB(cLX1),
1
'Xc is refreshed by:
1
'Xc =BitDe (
1
'Xc )
T 
·BLSB. 
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until LSB(cLX1)=br. 
The marked ciphertext is obtained: 
'
i
Xc and '
i
Yc (i=1, 2,…, 8).  
According to the framework in Fig. 2(a), after receiving the 
marked ciphertext, the client user could implement the 
decryption on the marked ciphertext to obtain X' and Y' by using 
s: 
'
i
Xb = Decs ( '
i
Xc ), '
i
Yb = Decs ( '
i
Yc ), (i=1, 2, … , 8). The 
additional data could be extracted according to DE extraction 
(Eq. (6)) and the pixels could be recovered according to DE 
recovery (Eqs. (7), (3), and (4)). 
5) LSB extraction from the marked ciphertext 
Additional data could be directly extracted from ciphertext 
without the private key s (X is the “1” signed pixel by Mava): 
br = LSB(cLX1)                                     (36) 
bs =k⊕br                                                                  (37) 
6) FHE encapsulated DE recovery 
FHE encapsulated DE recovery is implemented by the servers 
to return a new ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext 
without additional data embedded.  
Step 1: Calculate 
'
i
hc  (i=1, 2, … , 8) by using (
8
'Xc ,
7
'Xc  ,…, 
1
'Xc )(
8
'Yc ,
7
'Yc ,…, 
1
'Yc )according to Eq. (1): (
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc )= 
Sub*( 8
'Xc ,
7
'Xc  ,…, 
1
'Xc ;
8
'Yc ,
7
'Yc ,…, 
1
'Yc ).  
Step 2: Calculate ctemp0= Enc(0). The encrypted h  (
8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc ) can be obtained according to Eq. (7): (
8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc ) =( ctemp0,
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
2
'hc ). 
Step 3: Calculate the encrypted (X'+Y')  (
8
sum"c ,
7
sum"c ,…, 
1
sum"c )= Add* (
8
'Xc ,
7
'Xc  ,…, 
1
'Xc ;
8
'Yc ,
7
'Yc ,…, 
1
'Yc ). 
Step 4: Refresh ctemp0= Enc(0), and the encrypted l, (
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ), can be obtained according to Eq. (2): (ctemp0, 
8
sum"c ,
7
sum"c ,…, 
2
sum"c ). 
Step 5: Calculate ctemp1= Enc(1). And calculate the encrypted 
(h+1)  (
8
sum"'c ,
7
sum"'c ,…, 
1
sum"'c )= Add* (
8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc ; ctemp0, 
ctemp0,…, ctemp0, 
ctemp1).  
Step 6: Refresh ctemp0= Enc(0). The encrypted X and Y are 
restored according to Eqs. (3)-(4): 
 ( 8 'Xc ,
7 'Xc  ,…, 
1 'Xc )= Add*(
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ; 
 ctemp0, 
8
sum"'c ,
7
sum"'c ,…, 
2
sum"'c )        (38) 
( 8 'Yc ,
7 'Yc ,…, 
1 'Yc )= Sub*(
8
lc ,
7
lc ,…, 
1
lc ; 
 ctemp0, 
8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
2
hc )             (39) 
According to the Fig. 2(a), after receiving the restored 
ciphertext, the client user could implement the decryption to 
obtain the original pixels X and Y by using s: i
Xb = Decs ( '
i
Xc ),
i
Yb = Decs ( '
i
Yc ), (i=1, 2, … , 8). 
7) FHE encapsulated DE extraction 
It shares the same step as Step 1 in FHE encapsulated DE 
recovery to obtain the encrypted h'  (
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc ). The 
encrypted bs is 
1
'hc . 
After receiving the encrypted additional data, the client user 
could implement the decryption to obtain the embedded data: bs 
= Decs (
1
'hc ). 
C. Efficient FHEE-DE 
1) Preprocessing of DE    
Efficient FHEE-DE shares the same preprocessing as universal 
FHEE-DE. 
2) Encryption 
The client user calculates the (h, l) of (X, Y) first. The (h, l) 
would be encrypted as ciphertext which would be uploaded to 
the server: i
hc =Enc(
i
hb  ) and 
i
lc =Enc(
i
lb  ) (i=1, 2, … , 8). 
3) FHE encapsulated DE data hiding 
Calculate cbs= Enc(bs) and ctemp0= Enc(0). The encrypted h' 
( 8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc ) can be obtained according to Eq. (5): (
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
1
'hc ) = Add* (
7
hc ,
6
hc ,…, 
1
hc , ctemp0; ctemp0, ctemp0,…, 
ctemp0, 
cbs). 
Return 
'
i
hc and
i
lc  (i=1, 2, … , 8) as the DE embedded 
ciphertext. 
4) Key-switching based LSB data hiding 
Step 1: The same as Step1 of Key-switching based LSB data 
hiding in universal FHEE-DE. Denote the last element of 1
'hc as 
cLh1, whose LSB would be replaced by br. 
Step 2: If br = LSB(cLh1),
1
'hc maintains the same, or if br ≠ 
LSB(cLh1),
1
'hc =BitDe (
1
'hc )
T 
· BLSB. 
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until LSB(cLh1)=br. 
The marked ciphertext is obtained: 
'
i
hc and
i
lc (i=1, 2, …, 8).  
After receiving the marked ciphertext, the client user could 
decrypt it and obtain the marked (h', l') by using s: 
'
i
hb = Decs 
(
'
i
hc ),
i
lb = Decs (
i
lc ), (i=1, 2, … , 8). Then DE extraction and 
recovery could be implemented.  
Efficient FHEE-DE shares the same LSB extraction from the 
marked ciphertext as universal FHEE-DE. 
5) FHE encapsulated DE recovery 
Calculate ctemp0= Enc(0). The encrypted h  (
8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc ) 
can be obtained according to Eq. (7): ( 8
hc ,
7
hc ,…, 
1
hc ) =( ctemp0,
8
'hc ,
7
'hc ,…, 
2
'hc ). The unmarked 
i
hc and
i
lc  (i=1, 2, … , 8) are 
obtained. The client user could decrypt it to obtain h and l, and 
restore X and Y losslessly. 
6) FHE encapsulated DE extraction 
The encrypted bs is obtained by cbs 
= 1
'hc . The client user could 
decrypt it to obtain the embedded data. 
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Correctness 
The correctness of the proposed scheme includes the lossless 
restoration of plaintext and the accurate extraction of the 
embedded data. The test images, 512×512 8-bit grayscale 
images, are from image libraries, USC-SIPI 
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(http://sipi.usc.edu/database/database.php?volume= misc) and 
Kodak (http://r0k.us/graphics/kodak/index.html). The 
experimental results of six test images were selected in this 
section to demonstrate the correctness. The six test images are 
as shown in Fig. 4. The preprocessing of DE, LWE encryption 
& decryption, key switching, and KS-LSB were all 
implemented on MATLAB2010b with a 64-bit single core 
(i7-6800K) @ 3.40GHz. We referred to the method in [36] to 
realize bootstrapping, of which implementation tools and 
source codes are available on https://github.com/tfhe/tfhe, 
implemented in C++ on a NVIDIA Titan-XP GPU card. We 
performed bootstrapping operations after each homomorphic 
circuit calculation.  
Parameters setting: Solving the LWE problem with given 
parameters is equivalent to solving Shortest Vector Problem 
(SVP) in a lattice with a dimension
2 2log ( ) / log ( )n q  . 
Considering the efficiencies of the best known lattice reduction 
algorithms, the secure dimension of the lattice must reach 500 
(   ) [37], [38]. An increase in n will result in a high 
encryption blowup. To balance security and the efficiency of 
practical use, we set n =240, q=57601, d =4573. To ensure the 
fidelity of the marked plaintext, we set hfid=10.  
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
 
(c)  
 
(d)  
 
(e)  
 
(f) 
Fig. 4. The test images. (a) Lena; (b) Baboon; (c) Crowd; (d) Tank; (e) Peppers; (f) Plane. 
 
1) Reversibility of plaintext recovery 
In the proposed scheme, there are two cases for plaintext 
recovery: a) the user directly decrypts the marked ciphertext to 
get the marked plaintext. We calculated the PSNR of the 
marked plaintext, named by PSNR1. And then the plaintext can 
be obtained after DE recovery. We then calculated the PSNR of 
the recovered plaintext, named by PSNR2. b) The third server 
implements FHEE-DE recovery on the marked ciphertext to 
obtain new ciphertext. The user receives the new ciphertext and 
decrypts it to obtain the plaintext. The PSNR of the plaintext is 
named by PSNR3.  
In the experiment, we obtained the available pixel pairs for 
difference extension according to the constraints in Eqs. 
(18)-(20). For the ciphertext of the available pixel pairs, two 
encrypted pixels would carry one bit of additional data by 
FHEE-DE, and an extra bit by KS-LSB. However, the actual 
content of the two bits of embedded data is the same. We 
counted the two bits of embedded data as one bit of embedding 
capacity. Therefore, the maximum EC of an image is only 
related to the number of the available pixel pairs.  
The values of PSNR of DE in [15] and PSNR1-3 with the 
maximum EC are listed in Table II. From the results of PSNR1, 
it could be seen that there is embedding distortion in the marked 
plaintext of FHEE-DE, and the degree of distortion is lower 
than DE in [15]. Both PSNR2 and PSNR3 are “ ”, indicating 
that the recovered plaintext has achieved no distortion. 
We continue to analyze the PSNR1 of the test images at 
different EC. Fig. 5 shows that the principle of DE is to improve 
the fault-tolerance ability of the difference between pixels 
through difference expansion, so that additional information 
can be reversibly loaded. Therefore, the smaller the difference 
is, the smaller modification the embedded pixel has. When 
performing a non-full-embedded experiment, the available 
pixel pairs were preferentially selected with a smaller hfid. 
TABLE II 
THE PSNR (dB) OF ED AND FHEE-DE WITH THE MAXIMUM 
EC(bits). 
Image Max EC  PSNR in [15] PSNR1 PSNR2 PSNR3 
Lena 110195 33.6360 42.1171     
Baboon 69286 29.2830 41.3894     
Crowd 104882 33.2144 42.4764     
Tank 108963 35.3958 40.4472     
Peppers 110558 34.0715 40.5025     
Plane 114834 33.4095 42.8519     
Average 103120 33.1684 41.6308     
 
0 255Y XY' X'
l
h
h'
 
Fig. 5. The principle of difference expansion. 
The marked images of Lena with different hfid are as shown 
in Fig. 6. In Table III, we list the EC at different hfid and the 
corresponding PSNR1 values of the six test images. Then a 
comparison of the performance of PSNR1 was made between 
the three RDH-ED methods [23], [25], [26] and the proposed 
one. The results of test images from USC-SIPI and Kodak show 
that the proposed scheme has a better fidelity of the mark 
plaintext directly decrypted from the marked ciphertext. As 
shown in Fig. 7, we demonstrated the PSNR1 of the methods in 
[23], [25], [26] and the proposed scheme on the test images 
Lena and Plane. 
Compared with RDH-ED, methods of RDH for the spatial 
domain have better fidelity of the marked plaintext and more 
technical implementations. The introduction of homomorphic 
techniques into RDH-ED can provide a technical bridge for 
introducing more existing RDH methods into the encrypted 
domain. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 6. The test images. (a) Original Lena; (b) Marked Lena with hfid=10, EC=110195 bits, PSNR1= 42.1171 dB; (c) Marked Lena with hfid=2, EC=50232 bits, 
PSNR1= 52.2932 dB; (d) Marked Lena with hfid=0, EC=11434 bits, PSNR1= 64.7369 dB. 
 
TABLE III 
PSNR1 (dB) VERSUS EC(bits) AT DIFFERENT hfid . 
Image 
hfid =5 hfid =3 hfid =2 hfid =1 hfid =0 
EC PSNR1 EC PSNR1 EC PSNR1 EC PSNR1 EC PSNR1 
Lena 86605 45.6073 65303 49.3394 50232 52.2932 32104 56.6637 11434 64.7369 
Baboon 42522 47.9412 28553 52.5559 20702 55.9498 12464 60.7332 4210 69.0304 
Crowd 86962 47.0505 73240 50.1791 64164 52.1256 46810 55.9208 26504 61.0445 
Plane 100746 46.1582 85200 48.9055 71114 51.2680 50764 54.8316 19966 62.3590 
Peppers 80017 45.4989 56523 49.7460 42091 52.9404 26044 57.5117 8791 65.9745 
Tank 77887 45.6201 53520 50.3489 43832 52.5652 20988 60.6655 16843 63.1004 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 7. PSNR1 (dB) of FHEE-DE with different ER (bpp) on (a) Lena; (b) 
Plane. 
2) Accuracy of data extraction 
There are three cases of data extraction in this paper. The 
realization of the three cases is the embodiment of the 
separability of the proposed scheme:  
a) The third-party server directly extracts the embedded data 
from the marked ciphertext by using KS-LSB extraction. Fig. 
8(a) shows the comparison result bit by bit between the 
extracted data and the additional data with an EC of 100000 bits 
in the experiment. It demonstrates that the extraction accuracy 
was 100%. b) The user decrypts the marked ciphertext to obtain 
the marked plaintext, and then uses DE extraction to extract 
data. As shown in Fig. 8(b), the extraction accuracy is 100%. c) 
The third-party server first performs FHEE-DE extraction on 
the marked ciphertext to obtain the encrypted embedded data. 
The user decrypts it to obtain the embedded data. The accuracy 
is as shown in Fig. 8(c).  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 8.Errors of the extracted data: (a) Error1 from KS-LSB extraction on the 
marked ciphertext; (b) Error2 from DE extraction on the marked plaintext; (c) 
Error3 from LWE decryption on the encrypted additional data. 
B. Security 
Security of RDH-ED mainly includes two aspects: a) Data 
hiding should not weaken the security of the original encryption 
or leave any hidden danger of security cracking. b) The 
embedded information cannot be obtained by an attacker 
without the extraction key or the private key.  
In [27]-[28], through the derivation of the probability 
distribution function (PDF) on the marked ciphertext and the 
experimental analysis of the statistical features, it was proved 
that the ciphertext distribution before and after data hiding did 
not change, so that the security of the RDH-ED method was 
proved by certain reasoning. In this paper, we do not have to 
make relevant derivation on PDF or the statistical features, 
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because all the homomorphic operations of the proposed 
scheme are equivalent to the operations of re-encryption [33], 
and the encryption security can be directly guaranteed by the 
principles of FHE. 
The processes of implementing FHEE-ED and KS-LSB on 
the ciphertext are equivalent to the processes of re-encrypting 
the ciphertext, which would not reveal anything about the 
private key or reduce the encryption security. The additional 
data is encrypted by LWE encryption before FHEE-DE data 
hiding, or scrambled using sequence encryption by the third 
party before KS-LSB data hiding, which ensure the 
confidentiality of the additional data. During the transmission 
or processing by third-party servers, the third party does not 
obtain any information related to the client user's private key, 
nor did it expose any relationship between plaintext and its 
corresponding ciphertext. Even if public keys used in the 
re-encryption are all generated by the same private key, there is 
a random variable participating in the generation process, i.e., e 
in Eq. (23), thus ensuring the independence among public keys. 
Due to the random variable ar in Eq. (25), different ciphertext 
encrypted by the same public key would be also independent 
from each other, even if the different ciphertext were 
corresponding to the same plaintext. That is the advantage of 
the public key cryptosystem in application. In summary, the 
security of the proposed scheme can realize the security that 
LWE encryption has achieved. What is more, the security of 
LWE encryption reaches anti-quantum algorithm analysis, 
while Paillier algorithms cannot resist quantum algorithm 
analysis.  
C. Efficiency 
1) Public key consumption 
As shown in Table I, there are three types of public keys: A, B, 
and BLSB. Although they are not stored locally after generation, 
their consumption is directly related to the number of the 
operations of key switching and bootstrapping during data 
hiding, which determines the efficiency of FHEE-DE. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the public key 
consumption in different types of operations in FHEE-DE. The 
analysis of addition circuit (Add*) is as follows:  
In refreshing i (i=1,2,…,8): There are 1 bit-addition and 
1
1
i




  bit-multiplication. Therefore, the total amount of 
homomorphic addition is 8, and the total amount of 
homomorphic multiplication is 84. In the same way, we got 
Table IV.  
TABLE IV 
THE NUMBERS OF TYPES OF OPERATIONS 
Circuit 
Reflesh i (i=1-8) Total amount 
+ × + × 
Key- 
switching 
Boot- 
strapping 
Public 
key 
Add* 1 
8
1
i




  8 84 84 9 93 
Sub* 
9
1
i




  
8
1
i




  120 84 84 9 93 
 
In universal FHEE-DE, there are 7 add* and 3 sub*. In 
efficient FHEE-DE, there are 1 add* and 0 sub*. Obviously, 
compared with the universal FHEE-DE, the key consumption is 
reduced from o(100) to o(10) in efficient FHEE-DE. Therefore, 
the number of key switching and bootstrapping can be also 
reduced greatly. Since the computational complexity and the 
elapsed time of bootstrapping are much higher than other 
processes, i.e., encryption, decryption, or key switching, the 
efficient FHEE-DE has higher operational efficiency than 
universal FHEE-DE. 
The secondary expansion of ciphertext needs to be 
eliminated by using key switching technique. A new ciphertext 
can be obtained by performing only once matrix multiplication 
between a switching key and the old ciphertext, which is fast 
and can ensure the confidentiality of plaintext and the private 
key.  
KS-LSB data hiding is to randomly change the LSB of 
specific ciphertext by key switching until the LSB is the same 
as the to-be-embedded bit. Let the number of times of key 
switching performed for one bit embedding be λ, that is, the 
public key consumption of KS-LSB for one bit embedding is λ. 
Since the LSB of the ciphertext is 0 or 1 randomly appeared 
with a probability of 0.5, λ+1 obeys the geometric distribution 
as shown in Table V. It demonstrates that it would be a small 
probability event with a probability less than 3% to operate 
more than 4 times key switching to realize one bit embedding. 
The theoretical value of λ is 0.8906. In the experiment, we 
performed 1000 KS-LSB data hiding tests. The actual λ was 
0.995 on average, indicating a high embedding accuracy and 
efficiency.  
TABLE V 
THE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF β 
λ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
P 0.5 0.25 0.125 0.0625 0.0313 0.0156 
 
2) Elapsed time  
The public key encryption algorithms, including the Paillier 
algorithm and the LWE algorithm, have ciphertext extension. 
In [28], the ciphertext extension of Paillier and LWE 
encryption was discussed in detail. Due to the application of the 
separability of RDH-ED, ciphertext is usually stored in the 
server or the cloud, the local storage cost of users is not too 
much. However, the elapsed time of encryption, decryption, 
data hiding, and data extraction is related to the efficiency in 
practice. In this section, we mainly demonstrate the elapsed 
time of each operation. Table VI lists the elapsed time of the 
four main operations in FHEE-DE (the elapsed time of 
bootstrapping was obtained on the GPU card, and the others 
were obtained on the CPU card). 
The elapsed time is specifically the time (milliseconds) when 
one bit plaintext gets decrypted, or one public key is generated 
and consumed by the operation, e.g., one bit of plaintext gets 
encrypted after each elapsed time of encryption.  
TABLE VI 
ELAPSED TIME (ms) OF ONCE OPERATION IN FHEE-DE 
Operation Encryption Decryption Key switching Bootstrapping 
Elapsed time 20.5971 0.0067 0.1054 0.4922 
 
The brief structure and linear operations of LWE provide 
LWE based FHEE-DE with a low time consumption, which are 
significant in practice. The results in Table VI indicate that the 
elapsed time of the proposed method is acceptable for practical 
use. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
The main contributions of this paper are as following: 
1. We propose a novel scheme of FHEE-DE to realize data 
hiding in encrypted domain based on LWE. A fidelity 
constraint is proposed, which has enhanced the PSNR1 of the 
marked plaintext. Techniques of key-switching and 
bootstrapping are introduced to control the ciphertext extension 
and decryption failure, which might contribute to introduce 
other existing RDH methods.  
2. KS-LSB data hiding in the encrypted domain has been 
proposed, which supports the extraction directly from the 
encrypted domain without the private key.  
3. We propose an efficient version of FHEE-DE, which 
could remarkably improve the efficiency compared with the 
universal FHEE-DE by simplifying FHE operations. However, 
the technical scalability is not as good as the universal 
FHEE-DE. 
Experimental results demonstrate that the performances of 
the proposed scheme in EC, fidelity, and reversibility are 
superior to most existing RDH-ED methods, and fully 
separability was achieved without reducing the security of 
LWE encryption. Future investigation will focus on 
introducing more RDH methods in image spatial domain into 
the encrypted domain and optimizing the technique of 
FHEE-DE to further improve the efficiency. 
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